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It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working 
throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient 
spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure 
rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular 
probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach 
can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure 
rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically 
independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are 
due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure 
rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure 
rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix 
failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent 
may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of 
cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may 
be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the 
overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely 
external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to 
unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate 
for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable 
design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability 
estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be 
far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on the reliability that might be approached if 
many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.  
Nomenclature 
ACTEX = Activated Carbon/Ion Exchange 
CCF = Common Cause Failure 
CDRA = Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly 
ECLSS = Environmental Control and Life Support System 
FCPA = Fluids Control and Pump Assembly 
ISS = International Space Station 
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure  
OGA = Oxygen Generation Assembly 
OGS = Oxygen Generation System 
ORU = Orbital Replacement Unit 
PRA = Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
Pr(LOC) = Probability of Loss of Crew 
UPA = Urine Processor Assembly 
WPA = Water Processor Assembly 
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I. Introduction 
HE reliability risks that engineers are aware of are usually mitigated, so that many actual failures are surprises. 
In general, unexpected and unwelcome events show that our assumed model of reality does not let us predict 
and adequately control actual reality. The common reliability model assumes that all system failures are due to 
component failures and that they can always be repaired using spares. System behavior can be brought closer to such 
expectations if careful design and testing eliminates most system level problems and if external operational and 
environmentally caused failures are set aside as not faults of the system itself. The model falls notably short if there 
are system level failures or if the system is required to be reliable under actual operational and environmental 
conditions.  
Suppose it is assumed that a deployed system, such as recycling life support system travelling to Mars, can be 
kept operating throughout the mission by maintenance and repairs, as long as sufficient spares are provided. If a 
component has a fixed operating life of 365 days and the Mars transit requires 1,000 days, 3 units are needed. Rather 
than a fixed lifetime, it is usually assumed that components have a constant failure rate per unit time, so that the 
expected number of failures has a defined probability distribution. Logistics analysis can then estimate the number 
of spares required to provide any required probability that the number of spares will be sufficient. This number is 
computed using the estimated failure rates of each component. Considering the error or statistical variance in the 
failure rate estimates increases the number of spares needed. Reducing this error by testing, like reducing the failure 
rates themselves by redesign, reduces the needed number of spares. The total number or mass of the spares can be 
minimized for any particular reliability requirement.  
Spares logistics analysis can be useful but it can create problems. The most basic is that, like any mathematical 
model, spares logistics analysis depends on assumptions which may not always apply and which may not be 
considered when using the model predictions. Usually the logistics model developers are careful to state the 
assumptions; constant failure rates, statistically independent failures, and perfect repair. In reality, failure rates may 
change due to manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and even errors in redesign. Failures that are not 
independent may result from a common cause, such as bad material or a design or manufacturing error, and even 
from a cascade of cause and effect, triggered by an internal or external event. Attempts to repair may be 
unsuccessful or cause other problems. Externally caused failures can be due to assembly, maintenance, and 
operational errors. Most failures are not predicted by previous reliability analysis. Many occur at the systems level 
or at component interfaces, not within components. One approach to account for failure causes not included in the 
fundamental component failure rate is simply to multiply the component failure rate by some K-factor, and to 
increase the number of spares accordingly. This seems wrong. There is little reason to expect that the number of 
system level or externally caused failures is proportional to the number of internal component failures. Providing 
spares is appropriate to compensate for system component failures, but design and manufacturing errors, 
environmental impacts, and human errors seem to call for other directly targeted remedies.  
The list of serious accidents in space life support includes Apollo 1, Soyuz, and Apollo 13. None was caused by 
a lack of spares, but Apollo 13 was saved by an on-board built spare. The history of human space flight suggests 
there is a tendency to ignore risk, to assume unfavorable events will be handled, and to expect higher than 
reasonable reliability. The risk to safety must be considered and minimized as far as possible at every step of a 
program, through mission planning, systems design, testing, and operations. An overall Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
(PRA) of the overall mission risk should be developed and should include life support reliability and spares analysis. 
The system design should consider reliability at every stage of development.  
Achieving high reliability requires more than providing spares. The paper will identify the objections to the idea 
that spares are sufficient to achieve high reliability, classify the objections in groups, describe some examples, 
provide data showing how the approach can fail, and suggest a better approach.  
II. Objections to the idea that providing spares alone can achieve high reliability 
This section reviews some previous objections to the idea that spares are sufficient to achieve high reliability. 
Many papers repeat the same concerns, but do not suggest methods to cope with them.  
Work analyzing the International Space Station (ISS) failure experience found that it had “uncovered failure rate 
underestimates that would have resulted in an order of magnitude increase in risk had they not been discovered and 
corrected.” The risk increase is due to the probability of insufficient spares. Also, it was necessary to multiply the 
expected failure rate by a K factor “to account for external influences on maintenance demands such as 
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environmental effects, crew error, or false alarms,” but the K factor was not estimated. (Owens and de Weck, 2018-
198)  
Work criticizing traditional approaches to space reliability found that, “Ultimately, the approach to maintenance 
and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions.” 
Beyond random failures, “There are numerous other factors that may contribute to reliability and will also have to be 
evaluated and considered.” “The K-Factor defines the probability of ‘induced failures’ in spacecraft components and 
systems.” “Component K-Factors are defined based on past experience and may also involve a high degree of 
uncertainty for deep-space missions. Finally, there is the issue of “ ‘design and manufacturer errors.’ A significant 
fraction of failures on-board ISS have been attributed to ‘other’ causes, including some number associated with 
deficiencies in design or manufacture of components.” In light of “the inherent uncertainty in reliability,” the 
authors suggest that, “rather than manifesting a more closed-loop system (e.g., water, air, waste, etc.) and all of the 
required spares, it will be more efficient (and likely less risky) to simply manifest the consumables themselves.” 
(Stromgren et al., 2016-5307) 
Work on the limitations of reliability for long duration spaceflight found that increasing component reliability 
required greatly increased test time that led to diminishing returns. The use of spare parts would be much more cost-
effective. Spares reliability calculations assumed “that all repairs are completed successfully and there are no 
manufacturing defects, environmental effects, or unanticipated interactions.” “In addition, this analysis did not 
include common cause failures such as manufacturing defects, human error, or environmental effects. Operational 
experience on the ISS has shown that unanticipated issues continue to appear in human spaceflight, even after years 
of testing and operations. These unanticipated issues will most likely continue to appear in future missions, 
especially when new environments are encountered for the first time. Common cause failures can significantly limit 
the risk coverage provided by spare parts and redundancy, since a common failure mode that causes an unexpectedly 
low reliability in a particular component is likely to also decrease the reliability of all of its spares.” (Owens and de 
Weck, 2016-5308)  
An MIT Ph.D. thesis that computed the sufficient number of spares observed that, “every additional spare 
contributes progressively less to the overall probability of having sufficient spares. It is important to note here that 
this calculation assumes that all repairs are successfully performed and that common cause failures do not occur - 
hence the repeated reference to this result being a “probability of having sufficient spares” rather than a “system 
reliability”. This quantity can therefore be considered to be a lower bound on the total system reliability.” (Do, 2016, 
p. 149) As usual, repairs were assumed to restore good-as-new condition and failures were assumed to be 
independent with no cascades or common cause failures.  
Work on the supportability of long duration human missions emphasized the unknown unknowns. Supportability 
risk analysis “can only account for known or anticipated factors. Unknown or unanticipated effects can have 
significant implications for system supportability that must be kept in mind during system development. For 
example, the ISS ECLSS system has experienced several instances of component failure and/or degraded 
performance due to unanticipated issues, including significantly reduced component lifetimes due to dust and debris 
impingement, seal material degradation, component manufacturing and assembly errors, or even changes in the 
concentration of calcium in crew urine due to physiological changes resulting from the microgravity environment.” 
“These ‘unknown unknowns’ are, by definition, unknown. However, historically they have had a detrimental impact 
on system supportability, introducing additional risk factors. Therefore, probabilistic assessments of risk should be 
seen as a bound, rather than a guarantee; when risk factors beyond the scope of the analysis (known and unknown) 
are included, the actual risk will almost certainly be higher.” (Owens et al., 2017-5124) 
A paper directly challenged the idea that all failures can be repaired using spares and emphasized the importance 
of Common Cause Failures. “New untried systems usually have a high initial failure rate, called infant mortality, 
due to errors in requirements, design, parts, materials, and operations planning. These problems can cause groups of 
related failures called Common Cause Failures (CCFs). The practical definition of a CCF is any failure mode that 
cannot be cured using identical redundant systems or spare parts.” “Redundancy and repair using spares can be 
defeated by design errors, external events, manufacturing errors, and other kinds of common cause failures.” (Jones, 
2016-113)  
That paper continued, “It is often assumed that system failures during operations can always be repaired. This is 
the highly optimistic best case, corresponding to a reliable, mature, well-tested design. Analysis assuming all 
failures can be repaired can be useful, especially if it proves a system is insufficiently reliable because it requires 
excessive spares, repairs, and maintenance. But this analysis is not sufficient to prove a system will be reliable.” 
(Jones, 2016-113)  
A work investigating in-space manufacturing noted that “ISS experience has shown that unanticipated issues 
arise during the operation of complex spacecraft systems, even after years of testing and on-orbit experience. This is 
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particularly true for the regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) systems.” “These 
unanticipated failures often result from environmental interactions or manufacturing defects.” And, “it is unlikely 
that all eventualities can be identified and mitigated ahead of time for a multi-year mission to a new destination.” 
Furthermore, the availability of only a single system “means that significant uncertainty remains in failure rate 
estimates.” “(S)ystem failure due to insufficient spares is only one of many situations that could lead to loss of 
crew,” but it “sets a limit on the minimum risk that can be achieved.” (Owens and de Weck, 2016-5394)  
An investigation of space station life support maintenance noted a “need to consider failures in the facility and in 
the supply chain.” (Russell and Klaus, 2007) Facility failures may prevent normal system operations. The space 
shuttle accidents resulted in long periods where life support spares and materials were difficult to supply.  
III. Different types of objections to the sufficient spares assumption 
Many objections to the idea that all failures can be repaired with spares have been cited. They can be grouped 
into general areas or types as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Different types of objections to the idea that all failures can be repaired with spares.  
Type of objection Specific objection 
Incorrect model 
assumptions 
 
 Failure rates are not accurately known  
 Failure rates are often only estimates  
 Estimated failure rates are often too low  
 The model ignores most failure causes 
Repair process problems  
 Repairs may not be completed successfully 
 Repairs may not restore good-as-new condition 
Interface and system level 
issues 
 
 Failures often occur at interfaces rather than within components 
 Failures are often of system level processes 
 Failures are often due to component interactions 
Human error  
 Design, manufacturing, and assembly errors 
 Operations and maintenance errors 
 Incorrect operations, maintenance, and repair procedures 
Support system failures  
 Power, cooling, and other supporting systems may fail 
 The supply chain may fail 
Misunderstood 
environment  
 
 Difficult or unknown space and planetary environments (meteoroids, lunar dust, 
microgravity, radiation, Martian soil)  
Unknown unknowns  
 Surprise unanticipated system problems 
 Unpredictable adverse external system and environmental changes.  
 
The expectation that failures can be repaired using a predetermined number of spares is based on highly 
questionable assumptions.  
1. The component failure rates are accurately known.  
2. Component failures account for most system failures.  
3. The repair process is completely effective.  
4. Interface, system level, and human problems are not significant. 
5. The component failures are statistically independent.  
6. There will be no surprise failures.  
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Failure rates are often only initial estimates loosely based on similar systems, these estimated failure rates are 
often too low due to favorable subjective assumptions, and later, data-based failure rates may not be accurately 
known due to insufficient testing. Estimated reliability is usually too high because the model ignores most failure 
causes. All repairs may not be completed successfully.  
Failures often occur at interfaces between nominally operating components. Failures are often are seen in system 
level processes, not component functions, and can be due to component interactions, such as material flow or 
cascade effects. Human errors can cause incorrect operations, maintenance, and repair that may damage the system.  
Many of the objections in Table 1 are based on ways the component failures may not be statistically 
independent. That is, the failures may have a cause and effect relation or one shared origin, internal or external. 
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are essentially failures that are not statistically independent. With CCFs, when one 
component fails, its replacement is likely to fail in the same way for the same reason. CCFs prevent the usual 
approach to achieving high reliability by providing sufficient spares.  
Design, manufacturing, and assembly errors are also CCFs that can affect most or all the copies of a component. 
System problems where one component damages another can damage all the replacements in the same way. 
Harmful operations and maintenance procedures may cause the same problem every time they are used. External 
systems failures are classic CCFs, damaging components in a repeatable way.  
Unknown unknowns are unpredictable and inevitable, but there is a way to cope with them. Systems can be 
made more robust against surprise disruptions by implementing different, diverse, separate methods to accomplish 
the same functions or achieve the same goals. This is exactly opposite to providing identical spares to be used in 
identical systems.  
IV. Life support examples of the problems with the sufficient spares assumption 
The problems with the adequacy of sufficient spares approach are frequently mentioned and plausible, but the 
evidence is qualitative and anecdotal. Some of the failures that have been seen in ISS life support systems give some 
insight into the occurrence and impact of the different failure types considered above. ISS spares are usually Orbital 
Replacement Units (ORUs).   
A. Design oversight Common Cause Failures (CCFs) 
The failure and repair data on the ISS Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) has been tabulated and analyzed. 
(Jones, 2016-113) (Jones, 2016-103) The most significant OGA problem was the cell stack degradation and failure. 
Initially, the OGA recirculating loop pressure increased, apparently because the filters were clogged, and the filters 
and the Water ORU were replaced, and later new filters were designed and used. The problem continued and high 
pH was noted in the OGA recirculating loop. This seemed to produce corrosion products that clogged the loop 
filters. Ultimately the cell stack failed. The failure mechanism was as follows: the electrolysis cell membranes 
typically degrade, they produce acid and low pH, this caused corrosion products that blocked the filters and 
contaminated the cell membranes, this increased their resistance, driving up the voltage to the shutdown limit.  
The electrolysis cell stack was replaced. Many filters, the pump ORU, and the water ORU had been replaced 
during trouble shooting. After these replacements, the cell stack problem was finally cured by adding a new 
deionization bed into the water recirculating loop to remove the acid and contaminants. This deionizing bed is the 
ACTEX, for Activated Carbon/Ion Exchange. The ACTEX was frequently replaced in subsequent years to prevent 
cell stack failure. This is a classic case of a sequence of common cause failures that was due to a design oversight 
and that could only be cured by a significant design change. The cell stack problem accounted for relative few of the 
maintenance and repair efforts, 16 of 100, but its impact on crew time and operational capability far outweighed all 
other failure modes. (Jones, 2016-113) (Do, 2016) 
B. Unanticipated effects of microgravity 
The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) has had a continuing high rate of failures. (Jones, 2014-
075) A major problem has been damage to the CDRA check valves caused by dust and debris from sorbent pellets, 
which travelled further than expected in microgravity. The adsorbent beds were redesigned for better containment. 
Unfortunately this trapped dust, which blocked air flow and required another redesign. (Do, 2016) The ISS Urine 
Processor Assembly (UPA) distillation assembly failed due to precipitation of calcium sulfate due to unexpectedly 
high concentrations of calcium in astronaut urine, due to unanticipated astronaut bone loss in microgravity. (Do, 
2016) 
   
International Conference on Environmental Systems 
6
C. Manufacturing and assembly errors 
The ISS UPA Fluids Control and Pump Assembly (FCPA) had multiple failures of the due to manufacturing and 
assembly errors, including insufficient lubrication, parts misaligned during assembly, and incorrect machining. (Do, 
2016)  
V. Computing the number of sufficient spares 
This section identifies the sufficient number of spares for ISS ORUs using ISS ECLSS failure rates, assuming 
that the required system failure rate is < 0.001. The sufficient number of spares is computed using earlier estimated 
ORU MTBFs and later flight data MTBFs. The MTBF is the Mean Time Before Failure in hours. The failure rate is 
1/MTBF per hour. Flight failure experience often indicates that the MTBFs are shorter and the failure rates are 
higher than originally estimated. The higher actual failure rates mean that the number of spares based on lower 
estimated failure rates is insufficient. If the number of spares is based on lower estimated failure rates, but the 
failures occur at the higher flight data failure rates, the probability that the system will fail due to insufficient spares 
can exceed 99 percent.  
A. Assumed mission duration  
The assumed mission duration corresponds to a typical Mars round trip transit time of 450 days. Conjunction 
class Mars missions have outbound and return transit times of 200 to 250 days each and Mars surface stays of 400 to 
550 days. (Boden and Hoffman, 2000) The total transit time that recycling life support would operate is 400 to 500 
days, interrupted by a quiescent period of 400 to 550 days if all the crew is on the surface. The nominal 450 day 
transit duration is used in the failure probability and sufficient spares calculations below. 
B. Calculating the number of spares needed using the Poisson distribution 
Suppose that a particular ORU has an MTBF equal to 10 times the mission length L. Then the single system 
probability of failure during the mission is F = L/MTBF = L/10 L = 0.10. Further suppose that all failures can be 
fixed by using spare parts and that the system must have less than a 0.001 probability of not having a needed spare. 
This can be achieved by having one operating ORU and two spares, since the probability that all three will fail is F3 
= 0.13 = 0.001. In general, suppose an ORU has failure probability F and N redundant units. All the N units, the 
original system and the N - 1 spare ORUs, must fail for the system to fail. The overall failure probability for N 
redundant units is FN.  
This approach is usually adequate, especially for small N, but here it overestimates the failure probability by 
roughly a factor of N. This formula is correct for hot spares, where all the units are operating all the time and all 
failing at the same rate. Some systems use on-line spares, but not the ISS ECLSS, where the spare ORUs are simply 
stored. Only one unit is operating and the N - 1 off-line spares have a negligible failure rate. The formula that failure 
probability equals FN is correct for hot spares but not for non-operating spares.  
The probability of a given number of failures using cold spares is given by the Poisson distribution. It is used 
here to compute the number of spares needed to have a less than 0.001 probability of not having a needed spare.  
The system is required to operate over the mission length L = 450 days. The system has a failure rate, rate f = 
1/MTBF, the number of times it is expected to fail per year. The number of failures from time 0 to time t is n(t) and 
has a Poisson distribution.  
The Poisson pdf gives the probability, for failure rate f = 1/MTBF, that there will be exactly n(t) = x failures in 
time t. 
 Poisson pdf [n(t) = x] = (f t)x e –f t /x! 
The Poisson distribution’s mean value, which is the expected number of failures during the mission of length L, 
is f * L = L/MTBF. The probability of n(t) or fewer failures is the summation of the Poisson pdf from x equals 0 to 
n(t).  
C. The ISS ECLSS ORU MTBFs 
This section calculates the number of spares needed to have a less than 0.001 probability of not having a needed 
spare. It uses both estimated and flight data MTBFs. The estimated MTBF data is from MADS, the ISS Maintenance 
and Analysis Data Set. (MADS, 2015) The estimates benefited from ground testing but were made before flight. The 
flight MTBFs are based on the observed lifetimes of systems that have operated on ISS for about eight years. Some 
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ORUs have had no failures and some have had several. (Bagdigian et al., 2015) In cases where all the ISS ORUs 
have reached the end of life, the estimated MTBF is the average observed lifetime. In cases where one unit has 
operated without failure for eight years, the MTBF is estimated as eight years, 70,000 hours. If equipment has 
operated for a time T with no failures, this suggests that the probability of failure was less than one-half. So the 
MTBF can be estimated as roughly T. If the MTBF was much less, there would have been many failures. The 
MTBF could be much longer, but longer run time is needed to prove that. No MTBF is set longer than the successful 
test time, even where the previously estimated MTBF makes this seem reasonable. In cases where one unit has 
failed but its replacement continues to operate, the MTBF is estimated as the average of the two observed lifetimes. 
This produces a strictly flight data based estimate of the MTBFs.  
D. Oxygen Generation System (OGS) redundancy and failure probability 
Table 2 gives the OGS ORU MTBFs, both initially estimated and based on their observed flight operating lives. 
The required redundancy and failure probabilities are computed for both estimated and observed MTBFs.  
 
Table 2. OGS ORU MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and total system failure probability.  
Acronym  Full name  
MADS  estimate MTBFs Flight data MTBFs 
Added  
spares  
Failure 
probability - 
MADS 
spares with 
flight data 
MTBFs  
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
Hydrogen 
ORU 
Hydrogen 
Pressure 
dome 
29,551 0.365 4 0.00056 35,000 0.309 4 0.00030 0 0.00030 
Controller Process Controller 75,677 0.143 4 0.00002 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
O ORU Oxygen Outlet 99,252 0.109 4 0.00001 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
H2 Sensor 
ORU 
Hydrogen 
Sensor 57,803  0.187     2,600 4.154         
Pump 
ORU Pump 189,433 0.057 3 0.00003 35,000 0.309 4 0.00030 1 0.00389 
Inlet DI 
Bed ORU 
Inlet 
Deionizing 
Bed 
442,487 0.024 3 0.00000 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 1 0.00055 
Nitrogen 
Purge 
ORU 
Nitrogen 
Purge 140,195 0.077 3 0.00007 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 1 0.00055 
PSM 
Power 
Supply 
Module 
49,202 0.220 4 0.00008 49,202   4 0.00008 0 0.00008 
ACTEX ACTEX -Recirculation         11,000 0.982         
ACTEX ACTEX –By-Pass         20,000 0.540         
Water 
ORU Water 37,885 0.285 4 0.00022 38,000 0.284 4 0.00022 0 0.00022 
  Total failure probability       0.00098       0.00097   0.00562 
 
The MADS estimates are from (MADS, 2015) The flight MTBFs are based on (Bagdigian et al., 2015). The 
MADS MTBF is used for the PSM since no flight data was found. The H2 sensor and ACTEX are limited life items 
replaced as needed, and so are eliminated from the failure probability calculations.  
Six OGA ORUs have different estimated and flight MTBFs. Three of the OGS ORUs have significantly shorter 
MTBFs and so have significantly higher failure rates. These three each require one additional spare, going from 
triple to quadruple redundancy. If the original set of spares, based on the originally estimated MTBFs, was used, but 
the actual flight MTBFs were experienced, The OGA failure probability over 450 days would be 0.00562, 5.6 times 
higher than the expected 0.00098, based on providing spares for < 0.001. The failure probability using the originally 
estimated spares is nearly six times higher than expected.  
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E. Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) redundancy and failure probability 
Table 3 gives the UPA ORU MTBFs, both initially estimated and based on their observed flight operating lives. 
The required redundancy and failure probabilities are computed for estimated and observed MTBFs. 
 
Table 3. UPA ORU MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and total system failure probability. 
Acronym Full name  
MADS  estimates Flight data 
Added  
spares  
Failure 
probability - 
MADS 
spares with 
flight data 
MTBFs  
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
WSTA 
Wastewater 
Storage 
Tank 
Assembly 
82,200 0.131 3 0.00034 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 1 0.00055 
FCA 
Firmware 
Controller 
Assembly 
13,453 0.803 6 0.00019 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 -2 0.00000 
SPA 
Separator 
Plumbing 
Assembly 
88,993 0.121 4 0.00001 4,000 2.700 11 0.00012 7 0.28591 
PCPA 
Pressure 
Control and 
Pump 
Assembly 
59,221 0.182 4 0.00004 3,000 3.600 13 0.00010 9 0.48478 
DA Distillation Assembly 41,376 0.261 4 0.00016 5,500 1.964 9 0.00021 5 0.13638 
FCPA 
Fluids 
Control and 
Pump 
Assembly 
22,759 0.475 5 0.00014 1,000 10.800 24 0.00036 19 0.98272 
RFTA 
Recycle 
Filter Tank 
Assembly 
                    
   Total failure probability       0.00087       0.00083   0.99451 
 
As before, the MADS estimates are from (MADS, 2015) and the flight MTBFs are based on (Bagdigian et al., 
2015). 
Six UPA ORUs have different estimated and flight MTBFs. Four of the UPA ORUs have extremely shorter 
MTBFs and so have failure rates ranging from 7.5 to 22 times higher. These four require 7, 9, 5, and 19 additional 
spares to achieve failure probability < 0.001. If the original set of spares, based on the originally estimated MTBFs, 
was used, but the actual flight MTBFs were experienced, the UPA failure probability over 450 days would be 
0.99451, 1,000 times higher than the expected 0.00098 < 0.001. The FCPA alone has a probability of insufficient 
spares of 0.98272. The three SPA, PCPA, and DA ORUs have a combined failure probability of 0.68226. Failure is 
a near certainty. 99.5 percent probable, using the originally estimated spares. Failure probabilities that are ten, one 
hundred, or even one thousand times higher than predicted are frequent in life support equipment. (Likens, 1992) 
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F. Water Processor Assembly (WPA) redundancy and failure probability 
Table 4 gives the WPA ORU MTBFs, both initially estimated and based on their observed flight operating lives. 
The required redundancy and failure probabilities are computed for estimated and observed MTBFs.  
 
Table 4. WPA ORU MTBFs, failure probabilities, redundancy, and total system failure probability. 
Acronym  Full name  
MADS  estimate MTBFs Flight data MTBFs 
Added  
spares  
Failure 
probability - 
MADS 
spares with 
flight data 
MTBFs  
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
MTBF, 
hours 
ORU 
failure 
probability 
Needed 
redundancy 
Failure 
probability 
with 
redundancy 
CR Catalytic Reactor 27,077 0.399 5 0.00006 14,000 0.771 6 0.00015 1 0.00120 
GS Gas Separator 61,182 0.177 4 0.00004 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
IX Ion Exchange Bed 442,478 0.024 3 0.00000 442,478 0.024 3 0.00000 0 0.00000 
MCV Microbial Check Valve 178,447 0.061 3 0.00004 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 1 0.00055 
MFB Multifiltration Bed #1 349,650 0.031 3 0.00000 349,650 0.031 3 0.00000 0 0.00000 
MFB Multifiltration Bed #2 349,650 0.031 3 0.00000 349,650 0.031 3 0.00000 0 0.00000 
PF Particulate Filter  560,695 0.019 3 0.00000 560,695 0.019 3 0.00000 0 0.00000 
  pH Adjuster                     
PC Process Controller  70,745 0.153 4 0.00002 70,745 0.153 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
PS Pump Separator  39,429 0.274 4 0.00019 70,000 0.154 6 0.00000 2 0.00002 
RHS Reactor Health Sensor  134,077 0.081 3 0.00008 70,000 0.154 3 0.00055 0 0.00055 
S Sensor  184,618 0.058 3 0.00003 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 1 0.00055 
SF Separator Filter  642,342 0.017 2 0.00014 642,342 0.017 3 0.00000 1 0.00014 
  Start-up Filter  226,850 0.048 3 0.00002 226,850 0.048 3 0.00002 0 0.00002 
WD Water Delivery  81,797 0.132 4 0.00001 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
WW Waste Water 43,669 0.247 4 0.00013 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
WS Water Storage 40,463 0.267 4 0.00017 70,000 0.154 4 0.00002 0 0.00002 
  Oxygen Filter 342,548 0.032 3 0.00001 342,548 0.032 3 0.00001 0 0.00001 
  External Filter                     
   Total failure probability       0.00094       0.00088   0.00314 
 
As before, the MADS estimates are from (MADS, 2015) and the flight MTBFs are based on (Bagdigian et al., 
2015). The MADS MTBF is used for the IX, MFB, PF, PC, SF, start-up filter, and oxygen filter since no flight data 
was found. 
Eight WPA ORUs have different estimated and flight MTBFs. Five of the WPA ORUs have shorter MTBFs and 
have failure rates ranging from 1.9 to 2.6 times higher than the originally estimates. These five require 1, 1, 2, 0, and 
1 additional spares. If the original set of spares, based on the originally estimated MTBFs, was used, but the actual 
flight MTBFs were experienced, the UPA failure probability over 450 days would be 0.00314, about 3 times higher 
than the originally expected 0.00098 < 0.001.  
G. Summary 
The ISS flight data on MTBFs and failure rates make it clear that failure rates are often higher than estimated. Of 
the 20 ORUs with different estimated and flight MTBFs, 14 had lower actual than estimated MTBFs. 7 of the 20 had 
failure rates between 1.9 and 6.3 times the original failure rates and usually required one additional spare. Without 
the additional spare, the probability of insufficient spares in flight would be 3 to 5 times higher than expected. 4 of 
the 20 ORUs had failure rates from 7.5 to 22 times the estimated failure rates. These were the four UPA ORUs that 
require 7, 9, 5, and 19 additional spares over the number based on the originally estimated MTBFs. Without these 
additional spares, having insufficient spares in flight would have more than a 99 percent probability of failure.  
H. Why does the ISS life support system have lower reliability than expected?  
Some components are very unreliable, and the worst in ISS life support is a pump in the urine processor. This 
single highly unreliable component increases the system failure rate to a disastrous level, 98%. The source of the 
problem is clear. Reliability was intentionally sacrificed in the design of space station life support. A review of 
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space station life support noted that, “A current challenge of operating ECLSS and other vital ISS systems is to 
make them more efficient.” The example of gaining higher efficiency is that, “As we learn to work the systems, they 
get more robust, and it takes less time for the crews to do repairs in flight.” (Goldstein, 2011) Here, increasing 
efficiency is a more acceptable way of saying we need to improve reliability and maintainability. The review 
continues, “NASA engineers are also seeking to make WRS (Water Recovery System, WRA and UPA above) 
equipment more efficient. ‘You would think we’d know how to make long-life pumps,’ says Badigian (Robert 
Bagdigian, former designer then life support branch chief at MSFC), but in these applications where we are trying to 
make these pumps as small as possible … you end up having fairly unique pumps.” (Goldstein, 2011) The pumps 
are unique because they are small, don’t have long life (1,000 hours), and fall short in reliability and maintainability. 
Pumps are rotating machinery, subject to wear and failure. They are usually designed for long life and tested for 
reliability. But rather than use proven reliable pumps, the space station designed new ones for reduced mass and 
volume. New unique designs tend to have higher failure rates and undiscovered design errors. Cutting mass and 
volume ends to reduce robustness. In the shuttle era of very high launch costs, sacrificing reliability for mass was 
thought necessary. Operational experience showed that, even if needed, sacrificing reliability for mass was highly 
regrettable. Now that the launch cost has been reduced by roughly a factor of 20, more mass can be flown to achieve 
higher reliability. “You would think we’d know how to make long-life pumps.” We do and we should.  
VI. Discussion of the spares model for reliability 
There are problems with relying on spares and the spares model to keep a system operating but there are reasons 
why the model is often used and can be useful.  
A. The problem with relying on spares and the spares redundancy reliability model 
The problem with relying on spares to keep a system operating is that the expected MTBFs are often too long, 
the failure rates are too low, and the number of spares provided for the mission is too low. When the actual higher 
failure rates occur in flight, the spares are likely to be all used before the end of the mission, causing the system to 
fail. It takes only a few components with much worse than expected MTBFs to make failure almost inevitable.  
The problem with the spares redundancy reliability model itself is that is a partial bottom up model with limited 
scope. It accounts for internal component failures, but there are many other sources of failure that can prevent 
achieving the desired reliability. Even though spares can replace components damaged by externally caused failures, 
more will be used than those needed to replace the expected internal failures. All the spares may be used and the 
system fail.  
Unfortunately the spares redundancy reliability model may not be applied sincerely or critically reviewed. There 
may be a tendency to set the expected failure rates too low based on the optimistic engineering judgment that we can 
do better than historical experience suggests. It is easy to disregard failure modes not addressed in the spares model, 
especially those caused by unfortunate human errors. The problems of optimism and willful blindness also cause 
unrealistic budgeting and scheduling. Favorable performance predictions are welcomed, so the obvious risk of 
unfavorable events can be overlooked.  
B. Why is the spares redundancy reliability model often used?  
The component based reliability model has been used since it was invented in the German WWII rocket 
program. The originator, Lusser, developed the cheaper more reliable V1 cruise missile, while von Braun developed 
the V2 ballistic rocket. Later in the US, Lusser computed that Apollo was likely to fail. After the Apollo success, 
reliability analysis was dropped because it was too pessimistic. The shuttle designers did not mitigate obvious risks, 
for instance by providing crew escape. Risk analysis was reestablished after Challenger.  
The spares redundancy reliability model can be very useful if its limitations are recognized. A key limitation is 
that it accounts for only one of many types of failure, internal component failures. The model can be used to 
compare systems based on the best case, highest possible reliability. It can eliminate candidate designs that cannot 
meet the required reliability. The model can guide design for reliability, for instance by selecting reliable 
components, reducing parts count, and identifying key reliability problems. Component based reliability and 
redundancy analysis is a fundamental tool in any reliability development program.  
VII. A better approach to achieving sufficient reliability 
A better approach is needed to achieve sufficient reliability. The method should try to identify, quantify, and 
mitigate all significant risks. The systems engineering approach includes probabilistic risk analysis, systems 
engineering trade-offs, and design for reliability.  
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A. The NASA systems engineering approach 
Engineering for reliability should begin with a specific requirement for a certain probability of failure over the 
mission duration, which defines the maximum acceptable system failure rate per unit time. This requirement is 
determined by top-down systems PRA. The overall mission first must accept some probability of loss of crew, 
Pr(LOC). This probability is then allocated to the sequential phases of the mission. For a Mars transit, these include 
ascent, outbound transit, Mars orbit, return transit, and Earth reentry. For transit, the life support system and other 
habitat systems would be allocated part of the total Pr(LOC). This sets the limit on the probability of the life support 
system’s failure to perform over the mission duration.  
Systems engineering develops alternate architectures and candidate technologies and performs trade-offs 
considering performance, reliability, and cost. If especially high reliability is needed, simple, flexible, tested, and 
robust systems should be preferred. Unfortunately this discourages the use of the highest performing, most efficient, 
and newest technology.  
After system selection, the development process should design for reliability from the start. The recent NASA 
technical standard on reliability and maintainability no longer requires specific reliability activities during the 
sequential project phases. It requires developing detailed reliability requirements and planning how to implement 
them to meet overall project reliability objectives. The emphasis is on providing the evidence to show that the 
reliability requirements are met, rather than on conducting specific prescribed formal reliability activities, such as 
component based reliability analysis, to meet project milestones. The technical standard defines a comprehensive 
hierarchy of specific reliability objectives and identifies particular strategies to implement them at each level. The 
top level objective is defined and then one or more design strategies to implement it are developed immediately, 
before lower objectives are defined and the strategies developed for them. The new reliability process is aligned 
with the systems design process and helps ensure that the methods to meet the reliability requirements are built into 
the design. (NASA-STD-8729.1A, 2017)  
B. High risk can be recognized and magnificently overcome 
NASA’s highest risk human space project was also its most spectacularly successful, Apollo. Understanding and 
reducing risk was crucial to its success.  
The risk was obvious and generally appreciated, but its magnitude was not widely understood. Early in the 
Apollo program, the “calculation was made by its architecting team, assuming all elements from propulsion to 
rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 
were returned safely to the Earth. Even to do that well, launch vehicle failure rates would have to be half those ever 
achieved and with untried propulsion systems.” (Rechtin, 2000)  
Everyone in the Apollo program knew the risk was high. Everyone expected others than the Apollo 1 astronauts 
would die attempting to reach the moon. But this awareness ensured that everyone was intensely focused on 
reducing risk. The moon landings are a technical and scientific achievement that will forever overshadow the peak 
achievements of earlier civilizations. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space 
and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” 
(Rechtin, 2000)  
Individuals, an organization, a culture that is intensely focused on risk can beat the odds. To achieve high 
reliability, risk must always be a serious concern. Risk must be identified and minimized as far as possible at every 
step of a program, from mission planning through systems design, testing, and operations. Everyone in a program 
should be constantly alert for potential risks, even outside their own area of responsibility. In a safety oriented 
culture, any anomaly, even a temporary sensor glitch, is traced to its cause, understood, and corrected, no matter 
who, what, where, or when.  
C. Recognizing risk is unpleasant and often avoided 
The awareness of risk is an emotional fear response, partly instinctive and partly conditioned. Pilots, astronauts, 
and soldiers can learn to override fear. Most of us live most of the time in stable and secure circumstances, free of 
fear and unconscious of risk. But because feeling fear and being aware of risk is very unpleasant, most of us are 
reluctant to recognize risk. We are often willfully blind or deliberately ignorant of risk. The amazing 
unconsciousness of risk in space shuttle design and operations was the precise opposite of Apollo awareness.  
Risk is inevitable. The future is fundamentally unknowable and unpredictable. The unknown unknowns, the 
things that we don’t know we don’t know, cause surprising events. A method to anticipate the unknown is to design 
with simplicity and conservatism and for robustness and adaptability.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
The model of system reliability based on providing spares to repair failures can provide useful insight into 
intrinsic maximum system reliability, but using it can cause two serious problems. First, if the component failure 
rates are too optimistic, the computed number of sufficient spares will be insufficient. More failures will occur than 
expected, more spares will be needed than expected, and the system is likely to fail for lack of spares. A single 
component with a much higher than expected failure rate can render the system inoperative. Second, intrinsic 
component failures are only one of many types of failure modes. New and little tested systems may have 
requirement or design problems that create common cause failures and require redesigns. If they are prevalent, the 
disregarded failure modes can completely invalidate the spares model reliability predictions.  
The ultimate purpose is to meet the system reliability goal. A supporting objective is to understand the failure 
modes and the expected reliability.  A reliability development approach that is wider and more inclusive can help 
achieve understanding and reliability. A good systems engineering approach would include risk analysis, trade-offs 
including reliability, performance, and cost, and a development process that builds reliability into the system. Much 
more than providing spares is needed.  
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